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ALD-067 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
NO. 09-3602
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RICKY DANZEY,
a/k/a SAMADD, 
                         Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D. N.J. Crim. No. 90-cr-00304-10)
District Judge: Stanley R. Chesler
_______________________________________
Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 10, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed : December 17, 2009 )
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Rickey Danzey appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of his motion for
early termination of his supervised release, and its denial of his motion to amend. 
2Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily
affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I.
In April 1991, Rickey Danzey pled guilty to one count of participation in a
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin.  At
the sentencing hearing in March 1992, Danzey also entered a guilty plea to one count of
unlawful possession with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine in the
Southern District of New York.  The District Court sentenced him, as a career offender,
to 240 months on each charge, plus five years of supervised release.  Danzey filed a
motion in February 2007 to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The
District Court denied the motion in March 2008, finding that the Sentencing Commission
had not lowered the guidelines relevant to his sentence, and that the court thus did not
have the authority under § 3582(c)(2) to modify his sentence.  
Meanwhile, Danzey was released upon completing his term of incarceration on
December 31, 2007.  In July 2009, he filed this motion for early termination of his
supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).  He included a letter from his
employer, the North Jersey Community Research Initiative, d/b/a North Jersey AIDS
Alliance, which attests to his employment since January 2009.  The District Court denied
the motion in July 2009.  Danzey then filed a “Motion to Supplement Motion to Modify
Term of Supervised Release,” which the District Court also denied.  Danzey timely
3appealed.
II.
We review a District Court’s decision under § 3583(e) not to grant early
termination of a term of supervised release for abuse of discretion.  See United States v.
Smith, 445 F.3d 713, 716 (3d Cir. 2006).  
III.
Danzey argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for early
termination of his five-year period of supervised release.  Section 3583(e)(1) provides
that, after the defendant has completed one year of supervised release, the district court
may terminate the term of supervised release if “such action is warranted by the conduct
of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”  The decision whether to modify a
term of supervised release is a discretionary one for the sentencing court.  See Burkey v.
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2009).  Danzey asserts that his rehabilitation efforts
while incarcerated, and his current employment with a drug abuse and HIV prevention
organization, qualify him for early termination of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1). 
However, as the Government points out, Danzey was sentenced as a career criminal.  He
was arrested numerous times as a juvenile, and he served two terms of probation and a
commitment to the state reformatory.  His adult criminal history is even more significant,
including numerous arrests for crimes such as narcotics offenses, armed robbery, and
armed bank robbery, as well as two separate federal sentences, and several failures to
       In his application for a certificate for appealability, which we have treated as a1
response regarding summary action, Danzey also claims that the District Court failed to
notify him in a timely manner that it denied his motion for termination of supervised
release.  However, Danzey does not state when he received notice, nor does he explain
how any such delay would affect our consideration of the merits of this timely appeal.
   4.
successfully complete probation and parole terms.  The 18-month period following his
release in 2007 is the first time since Danzey turned 15-years-old that he, now 54, has
made it through a year without being incarcerated or arrested.  The Government
acknowledged Danzey’s success thus far, but cautioned that further supervision was
required given his history, the seriousness of the crime, and the sentence he is serving for
it.  The District Court properly denied Danzey’s motion, after full consideration of the
parties’ submissions in favor of and in opposition to the motion.
The District Court also properly denied Danzey’s motion to supplement his motion
for termination of supervised release.  In the motion to supplement, Danzey merely
asserts again that he satisfied the requirements of § 3583(e)(1) and cites three cases with
distinguishable facts in which early termination of supervised release was granted.1
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial
question.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders.  See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
